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Abstract
We criticize the theories used to explain the size distribution of cities.
They take an empirical fact and work backward to obtain assumptions
on primitives. The induced theoretical assumptions on consumer be-
havior, particularly about their inability to insure against the city-level
productivity shocks in the model, are untenable. With either self insur-
ance or insurance markets, and either an arbitrarily small cost of moving
or the assumption that consumers do not perfectly observe the shocks
to firms’ technologies, the agents will never move. Even without these
frictions, our analysis yields another equilibrium with insurance where
consumers never move. Thus, insurance is a substitute for movement.
We propose an alternative class of models, involving extreme risk against
which consumers will not insure. Instead, they will move, generating
a Fréchet distribution of city sizes that is empirically competitive with
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1 Introduction and Motivation
A small industry has developed that seeks to provide a theory to explain a
singular but robust stylized fact in urban growth: the size distribution of
cities. Zipf’s law or the rank-size rule, as applied to the size distribution of
cities, states that for any country, the rank of a city according to population
(for example, New York is ranked number one in the US) multiplied by its
population is constant. Thus, Los Angeles has half the population of New
York, whereas Chicago has one third the population of New York. This styl-
ized fact holds across many countries and time periods (see Soo, 2005), but
it is only one fact. In general, it is connected to Gibrat’s law, stating that
stochastic proportional growth tends to a lognormal distribution. The most
compelling empirical work in this area shows that the size distribution of cities
is lognormal (Eeckhout, 2004) when the data is not cut oﬀ at an arbitrary
rank or population. For those unfamiliar with the empirics associated with
this literature, we display in Figure 1 a graph of Eeckhout’s data, consisting
of more than 25,000 places from U.S. Census 2000. Since population on the
horizontal axis and rank on the vertical axis are both plotted in log scales, the
rank-size rule, taken literally, would say that the plot should be linear with
slope −1. Deviations from the rule or law at the top and bottom of the size
distribution are documented and discussed in the literature. See Gabaix and
Ioannides (2004) for a fine survey of the entire area of research.
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Figure 1: The rank-size rule. Data Source: Census 2000.
Explanation of the stylized fact by a theory has long been an objective of
urban economists; it is quite robust, but also very diﬃcult to theorize about.
Three recent articles, Eeckhout (2004), Duranton (2007), and Rossi-Hansberg
and Wright (2007), have tackled this issue head on.
As we shall see, the assumptions on primitives used in the literature gen-
erally do not look natural, in the sense that if one were formulating a model
of cities from scratch, it would not be obvious that one would want to begin
with these assumptions. In fact, the literature of urban economics prior to
the introduction of these models did not. Moreover, since these models are
constructed for a single purpose, namely to explain a stylized fact, they seem
incapable of explaining other empirical regularities, though they seem to be
judged exclusively on the basis of how well they explain the one stylized fact.1
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that there is likely an infinite number of mod-
els capable of explaining the size distribution of cities, and some of these might
not even be stochastic; see, for example, Fujita and Mori (1997).
1An exception is Duranton (2007), that explains 3 stylized facts.
3
We shall focus primarily on the behavior of consumers, in particular the
degree to which they can hedge against risk. Our findings are as follows.
First, the type of risk featured in the literature is city-level risk in the form
of a shock each period to the city-wide production function. The realization
of the shock is known to all before they make their decisions, in particular
consumer decisions about location and consumption bundle. There is no ag-
gregate risk, since the number of cities is large and shocks are i.i.d., and this
is often stated explicitly in the papers. In this context, insurance is a per-
fect substitute for consumer movement. We consider either self insurance,
where a consumer self insures over time by borrowing or saving to smooth
consumption, or insurance markets, where a consumer insures using the fact
that shocks are independent over space at a given time. With either type
of insurance (or a combination), we find an equilibrium that yields the same
period by period utility for each consumer as the one presented in the liter-
ature, where consumers move and generate Zipf’s law or Gibrat’s law. Our
equilibrium features no consumer movement. Moreover, with even arbitrarily
small moving costs or arbitrarily small uncertainty about shocks on the part
of consumers, only our equilibrium survives. The existing literature finds that
initial conditions don’t matter, in that the size distribution of cities eventually
tends toward lognormal. For our equilibrium, initial conditions matter in that
consumers never move. This is inconsistent with the evidence. In summary,
the theoretical literature excludes insurance markets and self insurance when
the models provide a perfect setting for them. When they are included in
the models, the predictions are inconsistent with the evidence. Thus, we put
these models aside.
Second, even aggregate risk is insuﬃcient to generate consumer movement.
For example, if there were a single aggregate shock common to all cities at
each time, consumers could still self insure by smoothing consumption through
saving and borrowing over time and never moving.
Third, our proposed alternative model has aggregate risk of a specific kind.
In the context of perfect competition, each city receives a shock to its produc-
tivity at each time. Only the city with the best technology in an industry
produces at that time, driving out others. Our equilibrium has consumers
moving to the cities producing with the best technology for some industry at
that time. Insurance against shocks is too costly, as it is almost the total wage
in a productive city. Our framework leads not to the central limit theorem or
Gibrat’s law, but rather to extreme value theory (the analog of the central
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limit theorem for maximal values of a sequence of random variables instead
of averages) and the Fisher-Tippett (1928) theorem. The implied functional
form for the size distribution of cities is diﬀerent from the predictions in the lit-
erature. Independence of shocks across time was a requirement of the original
Fisher-Tippett theorem, but is not required for modern versions.
The motivation for this paper is summarized as follows. First, we propose
a test of consistency of the models in the literature. Is the random variable
representing the uncertainty about a city’s productivity observable to all? If
so, it is quite natural to allow insurance markets. Is insurance available?
The answer to the second question is negative for the models in this literature
we have seen, with no explanation. If insurance is inserted into the model,
will it make a diﬀerence in the equilibrium and empirical prediction of the
model? Can insurance cause an eﬃciency loss? Finally, can self insurance
substitute for both insurance and consumer movement? Thus, we examine
the consequences of completing markets in this class of models.
We provide an alternative model where the random variable is observable
but the agents will never choose to use insurance. The equilibrium allocation is
first best. In contrast with the extant literature, where insurance is implicitly
prohibited but would be taken up if it were available, it seems to us that ours
is a more productive approach.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in section 2, we propose a new type
of model to explain the size distribution of cities, and implement it empirically.
Only in section 3 shall we discuss the related literature that attempts to refine
the stylized fact, namely the rank-size rule, and explain it. Then we shall
raise specific objections, involving insurance or self insurance against city-level
risk, to these models. Section 4 contains a brief discussion of welfare in the
various models. Section 5 discusses our conclusions and directions for future
work. In an Appendix we introduce Eeckhout’s (2004) model and modify it
to make the objections raised in section 3 formal for a specific example.
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2 Modeling the Size Distribution of Cities
2.1 A Model
2.1.1 The Basic Model and Its Equilibrium
This model is loosely based on Duranton (2007), but in the context of perfect
competition2 instead of monopolistic competition. It can also be viewed as
a slice of a larger model that would include both our model and the model
of Eaton and Kortum (2002). Our model adds labor and consumer mobility,
whereas their model has them locationally fixed. In contrast with the other
models in the literature, there is economy-wide risk in addition to city-level
risk. But this in itself is not suﬃcient to generate consumer movement. For
example, if all cities faced correlated shocks at each time, consumers could still
insure against this risk by smoothing their consumption through borrowing and
saving. Thus, we employ a more extreme form of aggregate risk.
Time is discrete and all consumers are infinitely lived. Assume that there
are many cities (indexed by  = 1 ) and many industries, each producing
one consumption commodity (indexed by  = 1  ). All commodities are
freely mobile. The production function for commodity  in city  at time  is
given by
 =  · 
where  is the output of commodity  in city  at time , and  is labor
input.3 The random variable  ∈ R++ will be discussed in detail shortly.
Suppose that each consumer supplies 1 unit of labor inelastically and that
the total number of consumers as well as total labor supply is given by  .
We justify the assumption of perfect competition by implicitly assuming that
there is a large number of firms in each city capable of producing a commodity
using a constant returns technology, but all experiencing the same city-wide
technology shock.
In each time period , each city  receives a random draw for its productivity
in producing commodity , namely . Since we will be using the Fisher-
Tippet limit theorem from extreme value theory rather than the central limit
theorem, there is no requirement that these random variables be independent.
It is assumed that with probability 1, the random draws for 2 industries at time
2Since there is no market failure built into our model, equilibrium allocations will be
Pareto optimal.
3The assumption of Starrett’s (1978) spatial impossibility theorem that is violated by
this model is the assumption of location-independent production sets.
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 for city  are not both maximal among all cities for these given industries.
In equilibrium, only the cities with the highest draw of the random variable
for some industry will have employees and population. (Alternatively, we
could simply classify cities exogenously by industry, and assume that a city in
an industry receives only a draw for that industry.) Extensions that imply
several cities produce in equilibrium will be discussed shortly, but first we must
explain the basic model.
The wage rate for the (freely mobile) population of consumers is given by
(). In equilibrium, it will be the same across industries.
As is standard in this literature, the utility function of a consumer at time
 is given by
() =
X
=1
1
()

where () is the consumption of commodity  by a consumer at time  and
 ∈ (0 1). Let () be the price of commodity  at time . Assuming that
commodities are freely transportable, a consumer’s budget constraint at time
 is X
=1
() · () = ()
Let () be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint in
the consumer optimization problem. Standard calculations yield demand for
commodity  at time  for a single consumer ():
() =
µ 
−() · ()
¶ 1
1−
Aggregate demand is given by
 · () = 
µ 
−() · ()
¶ 1
1−
Profit optimization yields, for each :
For  = 1  , for ∗ with ∗ = max
1≤≤, 0≤0≤0
() ·∗ = ()
Here we are assuming total recall, in that the best technology from the past is
remembered, so new technologies are not used unless they are better than all
the old ones. Also, only the best technology in industry  survives, where the
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best is across all cities and previous time periods. This assumption is made
for convenience. We discuss it more below.
Hence
For  = 1  , for ∗ with ∗ = max
1≤≤, 0≤0≤0
() = ()∗ (1)
In other words, even though wage is constant across occupied cities, output
price varies inversely with the production shock. Consumption commodity
market clearance requires, for each :
For  = 1  , for ∗ with ∗ = max
1≤≤, 0≤0≤0
∗ ·∗ =  · () = 
µ 
−() · ()
¶ 1
1−
(2)
This is the key equation for our analysis.
Labor market clearance requires, for each :
X
=1
∗ =  (3)
where ∗ satisfies ∗ = max
1≤≤, 0≤0≤0
Setting the constant () to be
() = 
µ 
−() ·  · ()
¶ 1
1−
and using (1) and (2), we obtain
For  = 1  , for ∗ with ∗ = max
1≤≤, 0≤0≤0
∗ · (∗) −1 = ()
Hence
For  = 1  , for ∗ with ∗ = max
1≤≤, 0≤0≤0 (4)
∗ = () · (∗) 1−
Since   1, labor usage ∗ and the shock ∗ are positively correlated.
Notice that cities that do not have an industry with the largest shock in that
industry at time  are empty.
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Existence of an equilibrium is not an issue here, since the equilibrium prices
and quantities can be solved analytically. For example, at  = 1, setting
1(1) = 1, then(1) = ∗11, (1) = ∗1∗, (1) = − ∗11 (
P
=1

1−
∗1)1−,
∗1 = ( −(1)∗11 )
1
1−

1−
∗1 , and so forth. Thus, equilibrium is also unique.
The original work on the asymptotic distribution of maxima drawn from
a distribution is due to Fisher and Tippett (1928). Modern, more general
treatments are given in Coles (2001) and Embrechts et al (1997). We shall
return to a discussion of extreme value theory momentarily, but first we will
draw the implications for our analysis.
The bottom line from this literature is that ∗ has an asymptotic distri-
bution of the following form, known as the generalized extreme value (GEV)
distribution:
 () =
(
exp{−[1 +  · (− )]−
1
 } when  6= 0
exp{− exp[−(− )]} when  = 0
Notice that there are 3 free parameters to be estimated here, namely ,
, and . Also notice that to use rank as the left hand side variable in the
regression, one simply computes 1− (). But from a pragmatic point of
view, it is easier to use ln( ()) as the left hand side variable.
If there are no upper or lower bounds on the distribution, then  = 0 and
the distribution is Gumbel. If there is an upper bound on the distribution,
then   0 and the distribution is reverse Weibull. If there is a lower bound
on the distribution, for example 0 in our case, then   0 and the distribution
is Fréchet.
Substituting (4),
ln( ()) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−
"
1 +  ·
Ã
( () )
1− −

!#−1
when  6= 0
− exp
"
−

( () )
1− −


#
when  = 0
(5)
Notice that if we use cross section data, then  and hence () is constant.
Thus, in addition to the 3 standard parameters for the GEV distribution of
∗ (namely ,  and ), for the distribution of ∗ there are two additional
parameters, namely  and , that arise from our economic model.
In conclusion, we note that consumers will not want to insure against this
risk. If only a small percentage of cities produce at any time, then insurance
would cost only slightly less than the wage, so the consumers might as well
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move and receive the wage in each period. For example, to keep things simple
suppose that there are 100 industries (or consumption commodities) and 100
cities in each industry (that is, each city is capable of producing only one
commodity). Then there is only one city producing in each industry at each
given time, and 100 cities out of 10,000 producing in each given time. As
time plays out, as long as some consumers are willing to move, each of the
cities producing at a given time will eventually be replaced by another in the
industry. The city using old technology has zero wage and no production.
So if some workers don’t move, their average wage tends to one percent of
the expected new wage with time. Under symmetry of cities in an industry,
actuarially fair insurance would cost 99% of the expected new wage. In other
words, if workers move they will receive the wage next period, but if they
insure they will receive 1% of the wage next period. The only way workers
won’t move is if they all agree to use old, frozen technology in each industry,
and collude so that none will move for a higher wage. In contrast, we assume
competitive behavior.
2.1.2 Extensions of the Basic Model and Further Implications
In fact, what we have presented is an extreme example. All that is needed
to induce consumers to reject insurance and move is that the probability of
unemployment next period is greater than zero if they don’t move. To obtain
stronger results, for example the GEV distribution, stronger assumptions are
required. Thus, there are many models like this in which consumers will not
take up insurance, but that do not require such strong assumptions. We
provide a simple one that is tractable.
We claim that the choice of insurance or moving is essentially a bang-bang
phenomenon, not only in this model but in other models of stochastic growth
belonging to the literature that will be surveyed in section 3. That is, generi-
cally one or the other will be better for consumers, so in equilibrium they will
not coexist. Moreover, in equilibrium there will be no partial insurance. To
see this, notice first that utilities are not state-dependent, so the state only
directly aﬀects budget constraints. Second, the decision to move is a discrete
one: Either all of a moving cost or none of it is incurred by a particular con-
sumer. If competition forces insurance to be priced competitively, implying
both that consumer cost is proportional to price and that it is actuarially fair,
then risk averse consumers will always want to fully insure or move, facing no
uncertainty in equilibrium. The consumers must consider whether the moving
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cost or the cost of full insurance is cheaper. Generically these exogenous pa-
rameters are unequal, so only one or the other will be observed in equilibrium.
Partial insurance will not result unless there is some defect in insurance mar-
kets, whereas the random shock in this entire class of models is assumed to be
observed by all agents. Generically, none would predict partial insurance.
Given the structure of the model and the others in the literature, it is much
more natural to introduce a market imperfection in the labor market: labor
heterogeneity and adverse selection, moral hazard, or search frictions, for ex-
ample. This new source of uncertainty or asymmetric information requires an
additional dimension for states of nature beyond the states we have specified
for production shocks. It leads to a diﬀerent form of a distortion or market
imperfection than the one in this literature, since for example labor supply
might be distorted. Although individual labor supply is inelastic in our basic
model, it is elastic for example in Eeckhout (2004); see the Appendix below.
Elastic labor supply could easily be put into our model in an additively sep-
arable way at the cost of further notation. The consequences of a distortion
in the labor market would be very diﬀerent from the introduction of an exoge-
nous mobility cost that varies between zero and infinity, as described in the
previous paragraph. Full or partial insurance would have to be defined over
states of the world associated with a new source of uncertainty or asymmetric
information related to the labor market, in contrast with the one already in
the model that is related to production shocks.
Returning to our basic model, the consumers still might want to insure
against aggregate wage volatility (namely movement in () over time) by
saving and borrowing to smooth consumption, but their spatial distribution is
still as we have laid out.
Returning now to our assumptions and extreme value theory, the original
theory of Fisher and Tippett presumed that, fixing , the random variables,
 in our case, were i.i.d. across  and . Of course, in our context this makes
little sense. In general, the city with the best technology for some good  at
a particular time  is more likely to innovate and produce a better technology
for the next period than an arbitrary city. Moreover, it is possible that cities
nearby are more likely to innovate than an arbitrary city. Fortunately, much
progress has been made in extreme value theory since 1928. The modern ver-
sions of the Fisher-Tippett theorem, as given by Coles (2001, Theorem 5.1) and
Embrechts et al (1997, Theorem 4.4.1) allow some dependence. Specifically,
what is required is that the sequence of random variables be stationary and
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that a form of asymptotic independence (as blocks of random variables become
farther apart in time) hold.4 Since temporal (as well as spatial) correlation
is allowed, the model can explain the persistence of an industry in a given city
over time. For example, the assumption that the process is stationary imposes
some symmetry on the spatial correlation, in that the influence of neighbors
on the productivity of one reference location is the same, independent of the
reference location. However, we note that even the modern versions of the
Fisher-Tippett theorem we have cited give only suﬃcient conditions for con-
vergence to the GEV distribution. There are yet further generalizations to
non-stationary processes; see Coles (2001, chapter 6) for example. So asym-
metries in space, implying that the process is not stationary, can still lead to
the GEV distribution.
Returning to the case of i.i.d. technology draws, an implication of extreme
value theory (Embrechts et al, 1997, chapter 5.4) is that the time between
new record draws of technology in an industry grow in a roughly exponential
fashion with the passage of time. This implication of the theory might not
hold in more general settings, for example non-stationary ones.
It is also important to note that the model and results can be extended to
the case where more than one city in an industry produces. This could happen,
for example, if there is transportation cost for consumption goods between
cities, so a city with a high realization of productivity for a commodity, but
not the highest, might serve a local market. It turns out that extreme value
theory applies not only to the maximum of a sequence of random variables,
but also to the upper order statistics. A detailed discussion of the results
can be found in Embrechts et al (1997, Section 4.2). It appears that these
extensions of the model require a simulation approach, as the analytics are
diﬃcult. Specifically, the calculation of aggregate demand on the right hand
side of equation (2) becomes diﬃcult due to the endogeneity of market area.
A couple more remarks are in order. First, the role of having diﬀerent in-
dustries , as in the other models in the literature, is to generate a full distrib-
ution of limiting populations rather than just one realization of the asymptotic
distribution of city populations. Second, in contrast with other models in the
literature, the cities without the best technology for some industry at a given
time have zero population, so they don’t show up in the data because they are
rural.
4An easy way to fit our structure into the theory is to fix an industry  and imagine that
at each time , there are  subperiods. A city  draws its random variable  in subperiod
 of time .
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2.1.3 Stochastic Proportional Growth
As a complement to our basic analysis of the model, it is interesting to see
under what conditions our model will generate stochastic proportional growth
in (occupied) city populations. To examine this, we must specialize and
reinterpret slightly the stochastic part of our model, inspired by Eeckhout
(2004, p. 1447). Suppose that a primitive productivity random variable is
generated by the AR(1) process:
 =  ·(−1) + 1−  · (−1) (6)
where (−1) is i.i.d. with mean 0 and finite variance, and where 0    1.
For the purpose of approximation, we will be taking  close to 1. Then define
the reduced form random variable  by:
 ≡ exp()
Our previous analysis applies to this more specific model of , for instance
the aforementioned Theorem 4.4.1 of Embrechts et al (1997), along with all of
the results in the subsections above. But with this additional structure, we
can say more.
Consistent with our notation:
For  = 1  , let ∗ be such that ∗ = max
1≤≤, 0≤0≤0
If the  are small, we claim that
∗ ≈  ·∗(−1) + 1−  · ∗(−1)
in the sense that the distributions of the two sides of this expression viewed at
time  − 1 are close. The reasoning behind this approximation is as follows.
Fix industry . If ∗(−1) À  · 0(−1) for all 1 ≤  ≤ , 0 ≤ 0 ≤  − 1,
0 6= ∗, then the city with the maximal draw remains the same between periods
−1 and , so the approximation holds according to equation (6). If ∗(−1) ≈
 ·0(−1) for some 1 ≤ 0 ≤ , 0 ≤ 0 ≤ − 1, 0 6= ∗, then the distribution of
 ·∗(−1)+ 1− ·∗(−1) conditional on ∗(−1) is close to the distribution of
 ·0(−1)+ 1− · 0(−1) conditional on 0(−1), so the approximation holds.
Dividing equation (4) at time  by its value at time − 1 to the power ,
∗
[∗(−1)] =
()
[(− 1)] · (
∗
[∗(−1)] )

1− for each industry  = 1   (7)
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Using (4) and (3),
 =
X
=1
∗
= () ·
X
=1
(∗) 1−
Now
lim→∞
P
=1(∗)

1−
 = [(∗)

1− ]
Hence for  close to 1,
()
[(− 1)] ≈
[(∗(−1)) 1− ]
[(∗) 1− ]
≈ 1
Taking logarithms of both sides of equation (7):
ln(∗) =  · ln(∗(−1)) + 
1−  ·
1− 
 · (−1)
=  · ln(∗(−1)) + (−1)
≈ ln(∗(−1)) + (−1)
This last equation is the form of stochastic proportional city population growth
obtained in Eeckhout (2004).
2.2 Empirical Implementation
Notice that we are not overly concerned with identification of the 5 parameters
in equation (5). In essence, the parameters are identified by the functional
form itself. The economic interpretation of these variables is as follows. The
three parameters of the GEV distribution, , , and , are analogous to the
mean and variance of the lognormal distribution estimated by Eeckhout, or the
regression coeﬃcients estimated for Zipf’s law using a log-log regression. They
have no direct economic interpretation. Since  and  are derived from the
model, they do have an economic interpretation. Standard calculations tell us
that 1
1− is the elasticity of substitution for consumers between consumption
commodities. The endogenous variable  is more diﬃcult to interpret, since
it involves a number of endogenous variables as well as random variables. But
equation (4) gives us the equilibrium relationship between the random variable
representing productivity in an industry (exogenous) and employment in that
industry (endogenous). So () tells us equilibrium employment in an industry
where one unit of labor produces one unit of consumption commodity.
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We use the Census 2000 data set also used by Eeckhout. Table 1 gives the
summary statistics for this data along with the MSA-level data that we use
later for comparison.5
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Unit Sample Size M ean Variance Median Mode Max M in
P lace 25,358 8.232E+03 4.677E+09 1,338 86 8,008,278 1
MSA 922 2.837E+05 9.490E+11 71,800.5 20,411 18,323,002 13,004
As noted in the sources we cite for extreme value theory, the most common
method of estimating extreme value distributions is to use maximum likeli-
hood. The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) does not yield the smallest
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic in our data set. The KS statistic mea-
sures the maximum distance between a sample distribution and its estimate.
As noted by Goldstein et al (2004) in the context of social networks and later
by Eeckhout (2009) in the context of the size distribution of cities, using a
simple log-log regression can lead to serious statistical problems. The use of
MLE and the KS statistic is preferred. It is interesting to note that both the
literature on estimation of the GEV distribution and the literature on Zipf’s
law seem to be (independently) converging on MLE as the preferred method
of estimation.
For purposes of comparison with Eeckhout (2004), we produce estimates
using each of the lognormal (his) distribution and the generalized extreme value
(our) distribution using equation (5), for both maximum likelihood estimation
and minimization of the KS statistic (MinKS). Table 2 below summarizes
the estimation results. The results of maximum likelihood estimation for the
lognormal distribution are identical to Eeckhout’s. The rightmost columns
contain the KS statistic, the log likelihood of the estimates (LogLH), the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
5For a definition of the spatial units used by the Census, see for example
http://www.genesys-sampling.com/pages/Template2/site2/61/default.aspx
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Table 2: Param eter Estim ates and Related Statistics - US
Unit D istribution Method b b b b b KS LogLH AIC BIC
P lace Lognormal MLE 7.278 1.754 1.895E -02 -2 .3477E+05 4.6955E+05 4.6957E+05
GEV MLE 1.410 .3096 -2.902E -02 57.15 0.8827 8.638E -03 -2.3467E+05 4.6935E+05 4.6939E+05
Lognormal M inKS 7.249 1.738 1.336E -02 -2 .3478E+05 4.6956E+05 4.6958E+05
GEV M inKS 1.592 0.6127 1.592 102.9 .8100 6.970E -03 -2.3470E+05 4.6941E+05 4.6945E+05
MSA Lognormal MLE 11.46 1.190 9.426E -02 -1 .203E+04 2.406E+04 2.407E+04
GEV MLE 4.295 2.192 0.6383 4552 0.6276 2.582E -02 -1.190E+04 2.382E+04 2.384E+04
In the interest of full disclosure, we report both the MLE and MinKS
estimates in Table 2. Notice that the MLE estimate implies a reverse Weibull
distribution whereas MinKS estimates imply a Fréchet distribution. Since
city sizes do not fall below zero, we expect the distribution to follow a Fréchet
distribution. MLE predicts otherwise due to the large, uncensored data set
containing places. The estimated Fréchet distribution under MinKS implies
that the smallest place will have population 1582, and two places actually fall
below this size. Indeed, once we truncate the data to MSA’s, MLE predicts
a Fréchet distribution. So the reverse Weibull GEV distribution is driven by
extremely small populations in the sample of places.
Of course, the comparison between lognormal and GEV is not quite fair.
In general, the more parameters a distribution has, the better its fit to data.
There are only two parameters in the lognormal distribution whereas there
are five parameters in our distribution, and these parameters do not contain
the parameters used for the lognormal distribution. In Table 2, we report
the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria, that penalize distributions with
more parameters. Smaller values for these criteria mean better performance.
Those two statistics indicate that the lognormal and our distribution are still
comparable when an adjustment for the number of parameters is made.
Graphically (in color), the estimates and data plots follow.
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Figure 2
In summary, estimates using the generalized extreme value distribution are
quite competitive.
3 Relationship to the Literature
3.1 The Older Literature
The innovative work of Gabaix (1999a, 1999b) is the source from which the
modern literature on the size distribution of cities flows. This work uses an
overlapping generations structure where consumers live for two periods. It is
assumed that moving costs are so high that consumers can only choose their
location (city) when they are young. This location decision is made after
shocks to production and amenities are realized for that period, and known to
all. The consumer/workers cannot move again when old. The wages or income
for the old in a city are never even specified, and it is simply assumed that the
young make their decisions in a myopic manner. Moreover, the availability of
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insurance or capital markets is never discussed, so it is unknown whether the
young can hedge against uncertainty about their wage when they are old in
the city they choose.
If the old people are immobile, why is this important? It is important be-
cause when the young make their decisions, they can anticipate what happens
when they are old, and might change their mind about their location decision
when young. In other words, they won’t behave myopically. Without myopia,
insurance becomes important.
3.2 Recent Literature
Chief among recent work are Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007), Duranton
(2006), Eeckhout (2004) and Duranton (2007). We focus on the latter two.
Eeckhout’s model has consumers who are infinitely lived with foresight
and who can move each period. There are technological shocks to production
in each city in each time period. It is movement of the consumer/worker
population in response to these shocks that generates Gibrat’s law. The shocks
generate changes in equilibrium wages, rents, and congestion across time and
space that correspond to the consumer movements that equalize utility levels
across space at each time. On p. 1445, the following statement is made:
“Moreover, because there is no aggregate uncertainty over diﬀerent locations,
and because capital markets are perfect, the location decision in each period
depends only on the current period utility. The problem is therefore a static
problem of maximizing current utility for a given population distribution, and
the population distribution must be such that in all cities, the population 
equates utilities across cities.”
Here we wish to make an important distinction between transfers of con-
sumption across time, namely perfect capital markets, and across states, namely
complete and perfect futures markets.
The actual consumer optimization problem in Eeckhout’s model does not
involve state-dependent assets nor does it allow state-contingent transfers of
income. If it were to allow this, as in a standard model of complete futures
or insurance markets, then agents would never move. They would simply buy
assets at the start of time that would pay them under a bad state in their city
at a particular time, and such that they would pay under a good realization
in their city. In other words, they would insure against the state of nature
in their city. It is important to recognize that in this model there are two
factors determining a worker/consumer’s productivity, namely the city-specific
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shock, and the externality in production induced by total population in the
city. Even if capital markets are perfect, the production externality is not
internalized (even with a land market), so the equilibrium allocation is not
necessarily first best.
The basic model of Duranton (2007) has consumers maximizing an in-
tertemporal utility function subject to an intertemporal budget constraint,
without facing uncertainty. However, once the detailed urban features are
added (in Section V and Duranton, 2006), the model looks similar to Eeck-
hout’s at least in terms of the urban features. One simply needs some depen-
dence of local prices (land rents or wages) on the state of nature. Then utility
equalization implies that people will move depending on the state realization,
but this movement disappears if one allows insurance.
There isn’t enough detail about the urban market in Duranton (2006, 2007)
to make specific statements about how insurance would work, but the con-
sumers in a city face uncertainty about employment due to the uncertainty
about innovations in various industries, so similar insurance arguments should
work if the details of the model are filled in.
Regarding contemporary developments in this literature, Behrens et al
(2010) is a very interesting contribution that does not employ Gibrat’s law
to obtain Zipf’s law. Using a static model, a number of stylized facts are
matched. There is an asymmetric information/adverse selection component
as well as a potentially insurable luck component in the model. There are also
standard issues with indeterminacy of equilibrium (or alternatively existence
of equilibrium, depending on how equilibrium is defined) that are common in
such adverse selection models.
The bottom line here is not that complete and perfect futures markets
are needed to upset the purpose of these rather fragile models. Rather, the
question is whether moving or buying insurance is cheaper for the consumers.
Typically in these models if moving costs are positive, it makes sense for con-
sumers to stay put and insure.
3.3 Criticism of the Literature
3.3.1 How Insurance Reduces Population Movement
So how might this insurance occur in practice? Let’s assume either that
consumers cannot perfectly observe the technology shocks to cities, or moving
has a small cost, or both.
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• Self insurance. Since consumers can transfer consumption across time,
and they know that shocks are i.i.d., then they can borrow or use their
savings in bad times and save (or pay oﬀ their loans) in good, staying
in the same city. In the literature, the intertemporal uncertainty faced
by consumers does not show up in their objective function, whereas the
possibility of self insurance does not show up in the budget constraint.
The earlier quote from Eeckhout seems to imply that this is allowed, but
the formal statement of the consumer budget constraint makes it clear
that this is not allowed. This type of insurance exploits the fact that
for any given city, the shocks are i.i.d. over time. Empirically, the place
to look for self insurance is in the savings response to local employment
shocks.
• Insurance markets. In all of these models, at each time the state of
nature (the random shock to each production function for each city) is
known to all and verifiable6 before consumers make their decisions about
consumption bundles and location. So this is a perfect setting for a
viable insurance market. An insurance firm can step in or the continuum
of consumers can simply pool resources in each period, smoothing their
consumption without changing location so it is independent of the state
in their city. This type of insurance exploits the fact that at any given
time, the shocks are i.i.d. across cities. Empirically, one place to look
for insurance is a cross-country comparison of how varying benefits of
unemployment insurance aﬀect mobility in response to local employment
shocks.
• Futures markets. Consumers formulate plans to sell labor and buy
consumption commodity and housing contingent on every possible state
in every time period. There is no empirical complement. We mention
this for completeness.
Given that for Gibrat’s law to hold, the shocks to each city in each period
must be “small” (see Eeckhout, 2004, p. 1447), it seems reasonable to think
that insurance would yield higher consumer utility than movement, if moving
costs are at all significant or if consumers cannot observe shocks to firms per-
fectly, and thus face even a small amount of uncertainty in their optimization
problems.
6Thus, such models diﬀer from models of human capital, for example, where verification
is not a realistic assumption and thus insurance against fluctuations is not to be expected.
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For models in the literature, consumers will choose to insure instead of
move when insurance is available. A common feature of both the models in
the literature and the model we have presented is the prediction that people
will move and not insure. A major diﬀerence between our model and the
balance of the literature is clear: An advantage of our model is that it can
explain endogenously the lack of insurance, whereas the other models in the
literature implicitly assume that such markets, namely insurance or self insur-
ance (saving and borrowing), do not exist. The empirical investigation of the
use of insurance as a substitute for migration, especially when consumer het-
erogeneity is taken into account, seems quite interesting as a topic for future
research. But as a preview, we present in Table 3 the estimates of the models
for Germany and Belgium, where likely insurance mechanisms are more devel-
oped and moving costs are higher compared with the US. Thus, one would
expect deviations from Zipf’s law and lognormal models, but not from GEV,
for Europe as compared to the US. We will remark on the welfare implications
of insurance in section 4 below.
Table 3: Param eter Estim ates and Related Statistics for Europ e
Country Year D istribution M ethod b b b b b KS LogLH AIC BIC
Germany 1998 Lognormal MLE 11.74 0.9865 0.1737 -2577 5158 5164
GEV MLE 2.242 1.159 1.081 3.179E+04 0.5085 0.05415 -2509 5027 5044
Belgium 2000 Lognormal MLE 10.84 .5697 0.2030 -806.3 1617 1594
GEV MLE 1.529 0.01775 .3513 0.6682 .9626 0.1064 -786.6 1583 1621
3.3.2 Possible Objections to the Criticism
We emphasize that the criticism we make is a purely theoretical point concern-
ing models in the literature. Whether or not agents in the real world actually
insure or self insure against city-wide risk is not relevant to the question at
hand. Our point is that in the theoretical worlds of these models, insurance
or self insurance of the sort discussed in the previous subsection is implicitly
excluded. The reasons are not given or, more importantly, included in the
model. If these factors, such as asymmetric information, are included in the
model to explain insurance market breakdown, other competing forces driving
agglomeration can be important; see for example Berliant and Kung (2010),
where it is shown that adverse selection alone can generate agglomeration. In
other words, this criticism of the internal structure of the models, for example
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when there is a non-zero moving cost, is that the consumers are not behaving
rationally if they don’t insure or self insure.
Next we present a discussion of why insurance market breakdown is not
natural in the context of the models. Again, this is not meant to be a statement
about the real world, but rather about whether the exclusion of an insurance
option for consumers in the models makes sense.
The usual cause of a breakdown of insurance markets is adverse selection,
represented for example by cream-skimming on the part of insurance compa-
nies. In the models discussed here, the state is assumed realized and observable
to all before decisions are made in a given time period. So there is no issue of
adverse selection. But one can easily imagine variations of these models that
incorporate some form of information asymmetry. It would not be natural for,
say, only consumers to know the shock to the local economy, since the technol-
ogy shock really aﬀects firms. If only firms knew the realization of the shock
before making their decisions, then consumers could draw inferences from firm
behavior, or the consumers could self insure or insure. It is not clear what
hidden information or hidden action on the part of consumers would cause an
insurance market breakdown in this context, given that the shock is to firms’
technologies. It is natural to assume that amenities are observable.
One can imagine moral hazard at the city level with insurance markets,
in that a city might try to claim a productivity level lower than the actual
one so the residents can collect more insurance money. However, there are
no local governments in the models in the literature to coordinate this, and
the assumption is that local productivity is observable to all, including non-
residents of the city, when they make their location decisions.
Another objection that could be raised is the commitment required on the
part of consumers. In fact, commitment to a plan or contract is a requirement
of models that feature self insurance, insurance or futures markets generally.
For example, a consumer might experience regret over the purchase of a long-
term health insurance contract after the state of the world that tells them
that they are healthy is realized. Or the insurance company might experience
regret if the consumer turns out to be unhealthy. But they are committed to
their contracts. In the models of the size distribution of cities, for example,
one could begin the random process of technological change and at any point
in time, allow insurance and commitment to begin. Then the population
distribution will not change from that point on.
Self insurance through borrowing and saving requires a long term commit-
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ment to a plan. Insurance cooperatives or firms only require a one period
commitment to stay in a city and work. The latter commitment problem can
be solved with the following time line, a standard time line for insurance in
the real world. First, people are in a city from last period. They make an
insurance premium payment to the insurance company equal to the maximum
possible income for a shock this period less the income workers received from
work last period in the city. This will be “small” since the random shock is
small, as explained in detail in the Appendix. Then they work and the shock
for this period is realized (timing here is not important). Then any insurance
payment is made from the pool to obtain the average income. After that, the
next period begins.
This way, people cannot receive income and then move without sacrificing
their insurance. Since in all equilibria the utility levels in every city in Eeck-
hout’s model are the same, they must lose utility by moving and giving up
insurance (the loss is their premium). Of course, one could then say that the
insurance company could abscond with the money. But this stretches credulity.
One might easily object to even small moving costs or even a small amount
of noise in consumer observations of shocks. Then what we present is an-
other equilibrium, that yields exactly the same period by period utility as the
equilibrium studied in this literature. This alternative equilibrium features a
uniform distribution of consumers, and does not generate Zipf’s law.
Finally, there are costs associated with insurance contracts that, from the
point of view of consumers, must be balanced against the cost of moving. Such
costs involve lawyers and potentially complex transactions. Moreover, unem-
ployment insurance might fulfill the role of explicit contracts. Self insurance
does not suﬀer from these problems. But credit constraints could limit self
insurance. In any case, insurance does not need to be perfect. If there is
substitution between insurance and mobility, the type of mobility needed to
generate the various empirical distributions of city size can be upset.
But we emphasize again that although these various insurance market im-
perfections can cause insurance market breakdown, their inclusion in a formal
model is necessary to ensure that consumers behave rationally when they don’t
insure, and the consequences of their inclusion are far from obvious.
Even if one takes as an empirical fact that there are no insurance markets
and uses this as an axiom, which we are reluctant to do for methodological
reasons, one still must explain why no self insurance is allowed in the models.
In the Appendix, we modify a model from the literature, Eeckhout (2004),
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to include insurance and to prove our claims formally. This represents an
example. We conjecture that the other models in the literature can be modified
in a similar fashion.
4 Welfare
First, it is important to note that the models of Duranton and Eeckhout fea-
ture equilibrium allocations that are second best, whereas the model we have
developed features an equilibrium allocation that is eﬃcient. In Eeckhout’s
model, equilibrium allocations might be ineﬃcient due to both positive and
negative externalities that are functions of city population, as detailed in the
Appendix. Duranton uses a quality ladder model with imperfect competition.
So statements about welfare in either of these models must account for the
theory of the second best.
In the model we have advanced here, staying in the same location instead
of moving to productive locations has a large cost, both social and private,
in that workers are not at the locations that are producing. Equilibrium
allocations are first best because the workers themselves perceive the cost of
not moving, so they move.
In Eeckhout’s model, the puzzle is: why don’t workers all move to the cities
with the highest productivity? It is obvious that output would rise relative to
the equilibrium allocation. The resolution, almost obvious, is that the negative
crowding externality (represented by the notation −) becomes very important
when city population is large. In fact, since utility is equalized across cities
in equilibrium, although output would rise if all workers moved to the most
productive cities, utility would decline in these cities relative to the equilibrium
level. It is for this reason that the use of insurance does not cause utility to
decline relative to the equilibrium utility level without insurance.
This same puzzle is much more interesting in Duranton’s model. But
we must give some background for the model first. Labor is used in each
industry by the quality leader, a monopolist, and by firms for research to
produce the next innovation. In the basic model, wage is the same in all cities
at equilibrium. In a steady state, it is also constant over time. However,
consumers’ utility rises over time due to decreasing quality adjusted prices of
the commodities they consume. Thus, workers perceive the private cost of
moving, equal to zero. But there may be social value to moving to become
a researcher, since more research would imply a faster decrease in quality
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adjusted prices, and thus higher utility. Once again, the introduction of
insurance does not change equilibrium utility.
5 Conclusions
So what’s the point? Well, actually, there are several related points.
• First, when a model, markedly diﬀerent from those found previously
in the literature, is constructed to explain a specific empirical phenom-
enon, the microeconomic, structural assumptions about individual be-
havior and markets must make sense. Here, there is a rather obvious
problem that self insurance and insurance markets are assumed not to
be functional. Models in the literature feature city-level risk, and it
is generally possible to insure against such risk through many vehicles,
barring asymmetric information. The latter does not arise naturally in
these models, since consumers are assumed to know the state of nature
before making their location and consumption decisions.
• With time in the model, it is even possible to insure against aggregate
risk through borrowing and saving.
• However, it is much more diﬃcult to insure against extreme aggregate
risk, so we propose such a model. Our model begins with microfounda-
tions and delivers a diﬀerent functional form for the size distribution of
cities than has been used in the literature.
In summary, we first propose a model based on primitive assumptions, not
designed to match any particular stylized fact (like the rank size rule), but
rather capturing the following theoretical notion: Insurance is allowed, but
consumers will never use it, as it is very costly. Instead, they move. The new
model is based on extreme value theory and yields a functional form for the
size distribution of cities diﬀerent from the other models, and this prediction
is empirically competitive with the ones in the literature. Then we advance
a criticism of the literature based on the fact that a primitive assumption in
previous work, that consumers cannot insure (either by borrowing and saving
or by pooling resources) against the random productivity variable for each city
that is observable to all. If insurance is allowed, there is another equilibrium
of the model with a uniform distribution of consumers where there is never any
migration. Instead, consumers insure against the risk, and the utility stream
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they obtain in this manner is the same as that in the equilibrium used in the
literature. If there is any moving cost or residual uncertainty, the equilibrium
used in the literature disappears.
Is insurance or self insurance an important issue for the analysis of the
size distribution of cities and city growth? The presence of insurance has no
eﬀect on our model, since it will never be taken up, and is simply prohib-
ited in the other models in the literature. Thus, direct evidence regarding
insurance or self insurance is insuﬃcient to distinguish between the models
empirically. From the theoretical viewpoint, it makes no diﬀerence whether
or not insurance is prohibited in our model, as the equilibrium is unchanged.
But it makes a huge diﬀerence whether insurance is prohibited in other models,
as the equilibrium with insurance and the equilibrium without insurance are
vastly diﬀerent. Other models from the literature that are modified to include
insurance will not generate Zipf’s law or Gibrat’s law. It is in this sense that
abstraction from consideration of insurance or self insurance by other models
in the literature is a first-order issue.
Future work includes testing further predictions of the model, for exam-
ple the wage and rent distributions when transport costs for consumption
commodities are introduced, and applying the model in new (but appropriate)
contexts, such as finance (see Gabaix et al., 2003, for an application of Gibrat’s
law to finance) or crop abundance (see Halloy, 1999, for an application of the
lognormal distribution to crop abundance).
Application to the size distribution of firms is of interest; see, for example,
Axtell (2001) in the context of Zipf’s law or Gabaix (2011) more generally.
Frequent churning might be expected more in firms than in cities. There are
two issues with this idea. First, in an aspatial model, moving between firms is
easy for workers, so our insurance critique will not apply to models using the
lognormal or Pareto distributions, which therefore might be more appropriate.
Second, we are using a competitive model since there is a continuum of firms in
each city producing the same commodity and subject to the same productivity
shock. The competitive assumption might not make as much sense in an
aspatial model where productivity shocks are firm-specific, so only one firm
has the state of the art production technology.
Finally, an interesting direction is to merge our model with that of Eaton
and Kortum (2002), though it is unclear if the added complication would make
simply adding an iceberg transportation cost to our model more worthwhile.
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6 Appendix: A Model from the Literature
Modified to Include Insurance
6.1 Notation
We use the model of Eeckhout (2004) as the basis for the analysis because it
is explicit about consumer behavior, in the form of an optimization problem,
as well as endogenous urban variables, namely local wages and land rents.
The original model is specified as follows. For complete detail, see Eeck-
hout (2004, pp. 1445-1446). In general, there is a large number of cities and
a continuum of identical consumers. Each city produces the same commod-
ity using labor and a constant returns to scale technology. The production
function is dependent on a city-wide shock and on a positive agglomeration
externality that is a function of city population. There is also a negative con-
gestion externality that is a function of city population and that only aﬀects
consumers. On net, the random shocks to productivity cause some, but not
all, population to move each period so as to equalize utility across cities in
equilibrium.
Time is discrete and indexed by . The set of cities is indexed by  ∈ .
Consumers are infinitely lived and identical. In city  at time , consumption
good is , housing or land consumption is  whereas leisure is 1− for labor
supply  ∈ [0 1]. Utility for a consumer in city  at time  is Cobb-Douglas:
(  ) = (1− )1−−
with   +  ∈ (0 1).
Production is constant returns to scale. The measure of population in
city  at time  is . Let  be the technological productivity parameter of
city  at time . This parameter follows the law of motion:
 = −1(1 + ) (8)
where  is the exogenous technological shock to city  at time . It is
assumed that  is i.i.d. with mean 0, symmetrically distributed, and satisfies
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1 +   0. The positive local externality (spillover) function is given by
+()  0, where 0+()  0. The marginal product of a worker in city 
at time  is given by
 = +()
For prices, let the consumption good be numéraire, the price of housing or
land in city  at time  be , and let the wage in city  at time  be . The
local negative externality or congestion function is given by −() ∈ [0 1],
where 0−()  0. The optimization problem of a consumer in city  at time
 is:
max
{}
(1− )1−−
subject to
 +  ≤ 
where  = +() and  = −(). Total land or housing in a city
is .
Using the first order conditions from this optimization problem and market
clearance, equilibrium (denoted by asterisks) in city  at time  as a function
of population  can be found:
∗ = +()−()
∗ = +()
∗ = +()−()
∗ = 
∗ = + 
The last equation in particular, indicating that labor supply is independent
of population, is an artifact of the Cobb-Douglas specification.
Substituting back into the utility function, indirect equilibrium utility as a
function of population ∗() can be written as
∗() = [ · +()−()]− [1− − ]1−− (9)
Under free mobility of consumers, indirect utility is equated across cities in
each time period, determining their populations as a function of their produc-
tivity and their realized history of shocks, summarized by . Instantaneous
utility is constant over both time and location in equilibrium. Again using
Eeckhout’s notation, call this instantaneous utility level  .
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6.2 Insurance
Let the discount factor be denoted by  ∈ (0 1]. In correspondence with the
assumption of complete capital markets, it is assumed that all consumers can
borrow or lend at rate 1 − 1. The consumer optimization problem (at time 0)
becomes:
max
{}
∞X
=1
 · (1− )1−−
subject to
∞X
=1
 · ( + ) ≤
∞X
=1
 · 
As stated by Eeckhout, the problem reduces to the one period optimization
problem if there are no insurance or futures markets. Formally, there should
be an expectation in the objective function and a requirement that the budget
constraint hold for every state of nature. However, this is omitted in the
literature since the problem is reduced to a static optimization problem where
the state of nature is observed before consumers make their choices.
There are several important points to be made at this juncture. First, it is
useful to imagine the consumers stepping back at  = 0 and making decisions
about their cities of residence and their consumption bundles for the entire
time stream of their infinite lives, contingent on state realizations at each
time. Second, and more important, it does not matter which interpretation
of the model one employs. Specifically, resources can be transferred across
states of the world (at any given time) in one or more of several ways. In the
end, what a consumer is choosing is their residence and consumption bundle
for every time and for every possible state of the world, optimizing utility
subject to the budget constraint. The state of the world at time  aﬀects the
optimization problem through the prices,  and , and income (through
−() and ) only. These variables depend on  both directly and
indirectly, the latter because  depends on  in equilibrium. The state
of the world at time  does not enter into the consumer optimization problem
otherwise. For example, it does not enter into the utility function. We could
index these prices and incomes by the state of the world, but that would only
serve to complicate notation.
As already mentioned, what will matter are only the lifetime choices of
residence and consumption bundles, contingent on the state of the world in
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each period. The method used to actually implement them, via transfers
across states in a time period as opposed to across time periods, does not
matter; there are many possibilities. With complete futures markets, at time
 = 0 the consumers can sell their labor in every future time period and state,
buying consumption good and housing in every future time period and state.
With insurance markets, at  = 0 the consumers can buy actuarially fair
insurance against price and income changes. With self insurance, they can
commit to a plan of borrowing and saving under all possible scenarios, namely
realizations of states in each time period.
To get the basic idea across, in the next subsection we show how insur-
ance would work from the beginning when all cities have the same initial
state (productivity) and population. This yields no movement at any time
in equilibrium. In the next subsection, we discuss how to extend this so that
insurance can begin from equilibrium of the model at any time . From that
time on, there is no consumer movement unless the insurance is switched oﬀ.
6.2.1 Insurance when the initial state is the same for all cities
To illustrate the ideas behind insurance, we begin with an example where all
cities begin with the same state at time 0 and consumers insure from then on.
For notational purposes, let  be the mean population of cities, that is
 =

∈ 
|| , where |  | is the cardinality of the set . Let 0 = 0
denote the common initial technology level for all the identical cities before
the process begins. Let 0 =  for all cities , so they all have the same
initial population. We assume that
 = ∗() = [0 · +()−()]−[1− − ]1−−
Thus, we assume for illustrative purposes that the initial configuration of shock
0 and uniform population distribution  generate the instantaneous equilib-
rium utility. This is to get the idea across; in the next section, we will show
how to start insurance from equilibrium at an arbitrary given time. In either
case, no consumer movement will occur once insurance begins.
With insurance, self insurance, or a futures market (or some combination
of all 3), we propose the following equilibrium solution for all cities  and times
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:
 = 0+()−()
 = 0+()
 = 0+()−()
 = 
 = + 
In other words, this is the allocation generated by a constant, over both
time and state, allocation with a uniform distribution of consumers. By con-
struction, it generates the same instantaneous utility stream for all consumers
in all cities and in all times as both the initial distribution and the equilibrium
studied by Eeckhout.
But how does this work in a pragmatic sense? Regarding futures markets,
each consumer works the same hours, independent of state. If the state
realization is good, i.e. if the consumer is in city  at time 0 and  
0, income in excess of 0+() · ( + ) is paid to the market. If the
state realization is bad, then the consumer receives income from the market,
smoothing consumption. Under self insurance, the consumer commits to
a plan of saving income in a good state, and withdrawing from savings or
borrowing in a bad state, thus smoothing consumption. The banks know that
() = 0, so they are willing to lend. Under mutual insurance, the same
type of idea, with commitment, has consumers who are in cities with good
states at time  contributing to an insurance pool, and those in cities with
bad states receiving payments from an insurance pool. If the number of cities
is large, the law of large numbers implies that the mutual insurance pool is
solvent.
It is interesting to note that the phenomenon we describe is something like
another manifestation of Starrett’s spatial impossibility theorem (see Mills,
1967; Starrett, 1978; Fujita, 1986; and Fujita and Thisse, 2002 chapter 2.3),
though here markets are incomplete due to the presence of unpriced local ex-
ternalities, both positive (+) and negative (−). In particular, we obtain a
uniform distribution of economic activity, in spite of the violation of one of
the hypotheses of the Theorem, namely perfect and complete markets. It is
well-known (from these cites) that the hypotheses of Starrett’s Theorem are
suﬃcient but not necessary for the conclusion, namely the lack of agglomera-
tion.
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In summary, the equilibrium time path of utility for every consumer is the
same, and constant, under insurance and under the equilibrium that generates
movement and eventually becomes lognormal. At the very least, a discussion
of why the latter equilibrium is selected should be oﬀered in the literature.
With any moving cost, the insurance or futures market equilibrium (the
one denoted with bars) clearly dominates the path with asterisks, the one put
forth in the literature. Given a choice between moving along the equilibrium
path or insuring at  = 0, each consumer will individually choose to insure.
A second, and perhaps more reasonable possibility, is that consumers ob-
serve  imperfectly when they make their location decisions each period.
In that case as well, the consumers will insure rather than move, since they
are risk averse. This can be seen in equation (9). When consumers cannot
perfectly observe  when optimizing, equilibrium expected utility will vary
in proportion to ().
6.2.2 Insurance starting when the state is an equilibrium at a given
time
The preceding subsection was provided to give intuition. However, it has
drawbacks in terms of commitment on the part of consumers if they use mutual
insurance at each given time, and on the part of banks and consumers at time
0 if the consumers use self insurance. Moreover, there is a strong assumption
that at time 0, 0 is the same across cities, each city has the same population
, and this combination produces the instantaneous equilibrium utility level.
Here we discuss how to dispense with some of these assumptions.
Suppose that we start running the model without insurance, so that con-
sumers are generally moving around, and stop it at some arbitrary time . At
this time, the instantaneous utility level of each consumer is, of course,  .
Consider a consumer in city  and the possibility of self insurance. At that
point, the productivity parameter in the city is , and everyone knows from
equation (8) that for 0  , (0) = . So if the consumers in that city
freeze their consumption bundle at whatever it is at that time, and commit to
staying in that city and consuming that consumption bundle forever through
a plan of borrowing and saving, they will obtain utility level  in each period.
This exploits the law of large numbers over time.
Mutual insurance, exploiting the law of large numbers over space at a
given time, is more interesting. Pick an arbitrary time  and freeze all the
consumers in their equilibrium locations as well as their consumption bundles.
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All consumers obtain utility  in this situation at time . Now consider what
would happen if they maintain the same location and consumption bundle in
time + 1. Given equation (8), the surplus or deficit in total wage payments
for city  relative to the benchmark inherited from the previous period  is
+1 · · +() · (+ ) ·  (10)
Thus, to ensure that this system of mutual insurance across cities is solvent at
time + 1, it is necessary thatX
∈
1
|  | · +1 · · +() · (+ ) ·  = 0
Although this cannot be assured for finite |  |, we can see that as the number
of cities |  | tends to infinity, the limiting result is a consequence of a law of
large numbers with weights given by 1|| · · +() · (+ ) · .
Since the support of the random variable 1 +  is contained in (0 2),
equation (8) implies that the size of  at given time  can be bounded over
 by 20. Since  and  are positively related, there is also a bound for
 and thus for the continuous function +() for fixed  over . There is
an extensive literature on law of large numbers for sums of weighted random
variables. Our framework would fit, for example, in Cabrera and Volodin
(2005, Corollary 1).
Notice that there is no commitment required under mutual insurance be-
yond the next period. So it can be switched on and oﬀ as desired, with no
consumer movement when it is on, and movement when it is oﬀ. If insurance
is carried on to period  + 2, then expression (10) updated to time  + 2 rep-
resents the change in the surplus or deficit in total wage payments for city 
relative to time +1, so solvency at time +2 requires that these changes sum
to zero across cities.
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